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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID W. GLASSCOCK,
Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

Case No. 950050-CA

STATE OF UTAH, BOARD OF PARDONS

:

Category No. 3

Respondent/Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (g)
(1994) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

David W. Glasscock has not marshaled the evidence in

support of the trial court's findings of fact and this Court should
therefore assume that the record supports such findings and affirm
the same.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court should survey the record in

the light most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact and
only reverse if there is no reasonable basis therein to support the
trial court's findings.

Northern v. Barnes, 870 P.2d 914, 915

(Utah 1994) .
2.

Petitioner has raised the question of the constitutionality of

Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme for the first time on
appeal.

This Court should refuse to consider this claim for the

first time on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Because this issue was not raised in the

lower court, there is no lower court decision to review on this
issue-determine whether or not to grant petitioner credit for time
served prior to conviction.
3. The Board of Pardon's decisions concerning petitioner were not
arbitrary or capricious.

The Board was acting in accordance with

its authority when it gave the petitioner a rehearing date, and the
Board is not bound by the sentencing guidelines.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This issue presents only a question of

law which this Court reviews for correctness giving no deference to
the trial court.

Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945

(Utah 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such materials are to be found in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David W. Glasscock, an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State
Prison, filed this action for an extraordinary writ alleging that
the Board of Pardons had no authority to give him a rehearing date
instead of a parole date. R. 7-8. Petitioner also claims that the
Board of Pardons, that looks with disfavor upon inmates who
continue

to

deny

the

criminal

wrongdoing

according

to

the

petitioner, thereby prevented him from presenting evidence to show
Mr. Glasscock's innocence for fear he would be determined to be in
denial and given a longer sentence. The respondent, State of Utah,
Board of Pardons, filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Petition
for Extraordinary Relief.

R. 42-59.
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The writ was heard on

November 18, 1994 by the trial court, R. 64. Petitioner's Notice
of Appeal was filed with the trial court on December 1, 1994. R.
65.

Judge Brian's Findings of Fact# Conclusions of Law, and Final

Order was entered on December 2, 1994. R. 68-71.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
David Glasscock has not sought to marshal any of the evidence,
either that supporting the trial court's findings of fact, or that
contrary to the trial court's findings.

For this reason, the

respondent-appellee submits the following Findings of Fact as
entered by the trial court on December 2, 1994 as its statement of
relevant facts. A copy of the trial court's Findings, Conclusions
and Final Order is attached hereto as Addendum A.
Findings of Fact
1.

On or about July 29, 1991, petitioner entered a plea ui

guilty to the offense of sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced
by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to serve not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
2.

Petitioner's

sentence and conviction have not been

reversed or vacated of (sic) appeal.
3.

On June 24, 1992, the Board held petitioner's original

parole grant hearing at which time the Board set a rehearing date
of November, 1994.
4. On June 24, 1992, the Board entered its rationale for its
decision which weighed the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstances and determined that an alienist report
would be due prior to the rehearing date.
3

5.

On February 14, 1994, the Board responded to inquiries

made by petitioner as to the reasons for its decision of June 24,
1992.
6. The Board, in part, justified its decision on the victim's
age

and

the

violent

nature

of

the

offense,

petitioner's

relationship to the victim, his denial of the offense, and the lack
of sex therapy while at the Utah State Prison.

The Board also

questioned family support and petitioner's prior arrest conviction
and supervision history.
7.

A rehearing was held on November 4, 1994 to consider

whether petitioner should be granted a parole date.

At the

conclusion of the hearing, the Board took the matter under
advisement.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
David W. Glasscock is serving a one-to-fifteen year sentence.
Petitioner presents several vague challenges to the Board of
Pardons decisions concerning his eligibility for parole, including
some that were not raised in the trial court.
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings, Glasscock cannot challenge the same and this
Court should assume that the findings are supported by the record.
The

Board

of

Pardon's

decisions

on how much

time the

petitioner must serve on his sentence has not been arbitrary or
capricious

and

the petitioner's

writ

was

therefore properly

denied.
Glasscock's

claim

that

Utah's

4

indeterminate

sentencing

statutes are unconstitutional was not raised in the trial court and
should not be heard, for the first time, on appeal.
The Utah Board of Pardons did not abuse its discretion when it
gave Mr. Glasscock a rehearing date instead of a parole date at his
original parole grant hearing. As long as the decision of the Utah
Board of Pardons as to the length of sentence that the petitioner
should serve does not exceed the maximum sentence set by law it is
presumptively valid and will not be considered

arbitrary or

capricious absent unusual circumstances, which are not present in
the instant action.
ARGUMENT
I.
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT - WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE
ASSUMED SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
Glasscock makes no statement of facts in his opening brief.
He does not marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
Findings of Facts. Petitioner does not seek to show in any manner
that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the
trial court's Findings of Fact. For this reason, this Court should
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court.
If a challenge is made to the findings, an
appellant must marshal all evidence in favor
of the facts as found by the trial court and
then demonstrate that even viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact.
If the
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and
proceeds to the review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.
5

,

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
The unchallenged findings of fact show that petitioner is
serving a sentence of one-to-fifteen years and that the Board of
Pardons has held two hearings concerning the eligibility of the
petitioner for release on parole.

R. 69-70.

At the initial

hearing, the Board identified the aggravating and mitigating
factors that it considered, and determined not to set a parole date
for Mr. Glasscock at that time, but rather to rehear the matter
some two years later, and that an alienist report be prepared for
the Board before that time.

R. 54-56, 69-70.

Because petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings of fact, and has not shown how the
evidence of record is insufficient to support the trial court's
factual

findings, this Court should assume

"that the record

supports the findings of the trial court" and proceed "to the
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law in the case."

Saunders, 806 P.2d at

199.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER
THOSE ISSUES THAT THE PETITIONER RAISES FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Mr. Glasscock claims, for the first time on appeal, that
Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as
applied to him. In the trial court, Glasscock did not present this
argument in any manner.
In the trial court, Glasscock claimed that the Board of
Pardons had no authority to give him a rehearing date, as opposed
6

to a parole date.

R. 9.

Glasscock also claimed that he "could not present evidence in
his behalf or statements in mitigation because the Board would have
held him in denial and if Board records were subpoenaed it would
prove those who attempt to present statements in mitigation get
held in denial."

R. 5.

In essence, this argument is that the

Board of Pardons, because it looks with disfavor upon inmates who
continue to deny responsibility for the actions that led to their
incarceration, intimidated petitioner from making his own claims to
the Board that he was innocent and that he, Glasscock, did not
commit the sexual abuse of a child to which he actually pled guilty
and for which he is currently incarcerated.

R. 5-8.

Petitioner claimed that he should have been afforded counsel
at the original parole hearing.1

R. 7.

Mr. Glasscock also claimed that the Utah Board of Pardons
erred in not following the guidelines in his case.

R. 9.

Finally, Mr. Glasscock claimed that the class of sex offenders
was a "suspect classification" and that he had been treated
unfairly because of his status as a sex offender.2

R. 10. At no

1

This issue has not been raised on appeal. Even if it were
raised, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly rejected the claim that
an inmate is entitled to the assistance of counsel in an initial
parole grant hearing in Neel v. Holden. 886 P.2d 1097, 1103-4 (Utah
1994) .
2

But petitioner failed to make any showing in the trial
court in support of his claim that sex offenders were receiving
longer periods of incarceration than other offenders.
Given
petitioner's failure to support this claim in any manner, this
court should refuse to consider this matter further. This claim
was not pursued before the trial court.
7

time did petitioner raise the claim that Utah's indeterminate
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional before the trial court.
In Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412 (Utah
1990), the plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim for the first
time on appeal.

In refusing to consider that claim, the Utah

Supreme Court explained:
Appellants'
first
claim
is
that
the
realignment violated article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution by denying them the
liberty to control their children's education.
This claim was raised for the first time on
appeal. With limited exceptions, the practice
of
this
Court
has
been
to
decline
consideration of issues raised for the first
time on appeal. We therefore do not address
this claim.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted).

The limited exceptions to this

general rule referred to in Espinal deal with cases in which the
appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed plain
error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case."
Seoulveda.
omitted).

842

P.2d

913, 917-18

(Utah App.

1992)

State v.
(footnote

See also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992) ;

State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).
It was the duty of the petitioner to raise any and all claims
against the respondent Board of Pardons in the trial court.
Glasscock's claim that the indeterminate sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional was not raised in the trial court.

Further,

Glasscock has not briefed the question of whether plain error or
other exceptional circumstances might exist that could lead this
Court to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Where
the petitioner has not analyzed an issue in his opening brief, this
8

Court will not review that issue.

Brown, 853 P.2d at 854 n.l.

III. THE DECISION OF THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE CONCERNING DAVID W.
GLASSCOCK HAS NOT VIOLATED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER
In Malek v. Sawava. 730 P.2d 629, 630 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court made it clear that an extraordinary writ is "not an
available

remedy

in

the

absence

of

a

claim

of

fundamental

unfairness at trial or a substantial and prejudicial denial of
constitutional rights." The trial court correctly determined that
petitioner had failed to present such a claim,
A. The Board's decisions concerning Glasscock's parole status were
neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board is not bound by the
sentencing guidelines and is free to set petitioner's period of
incarceration as it sees fit so long as the time served falls
within the applicable indeterminate range.
Glasscock's claims concerning the Board of Pardons' decision
to give petitioner a rehearing date instead of a parole date
demonstrate a misunderstanding of Utah law.

Petitioner does not

seem to understand that he is still serving a one-to-fifteen year
sentence and that the Utah Board of Pardons has discretion to
require him to serve any or all of that sentence. Preece v. House,
886 P.2d 508, 511-12 (Utah 1994).

The Board is not required to

conform to the sentencing guidelines.

I&.

Utah's sentencing

guidelines "used by the board of pardons do not have the force and
effect of law."

Id; see also. Hall v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 806

P.2d 217, 218 (Utah App. 1991).

Absent some other constitutional

infirmity, the courts do not sit as a panel of review on the
Board's function. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945,
947 (Utah 1994) .

"So long as the period of incarceration decided
9

upon by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable
indeterminate range

. . . then that decision, absent unusual

circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious."

Preece, 886

P.2d at 512.
The very claim made by Mr. Glasscock was rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court in Lancaster.

As in the instant action, Lancaster

involved an inmate's challenge to a rehearing date that he had been
given in lieu of a parole date.
He also challenges the Board's failure to fix
the exact number of years he would serve on
his indeterminate sentence, . . . None of
these claims describe a due process violation
reviewable under Foote or Labrum.
869 P.2d at 947. There is nothing improper or unlawful about the
Board of Pardons practice of refusing to set parole dates for those
inmates that the Board, in its judgment, feels should not be
released on parole.

Indeed the statute governing initial parole

grant hearings expressly authorizes the Board to give a rehearing
date instead of a parole date. Utah Code § 77-27-7 (1994).
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner's challenge to
the Board of Pardon's decision concerning the length of time that
petitioner must serve before he will be placed on parole. There is
nothing arbitrary and capricious about the board's decision to not
permit the petitioner parole. The Board of Pardons power to set a
parole date includes the authority to deny a parole date.

The

Board has the power to determine that an inmate should serve his
maximum sentence.
At best, the petitioner can only claim that this is what a
10

rehearing date is. The only argument petitioner could make is that
the rehearing date simply indicates that the Board is not inclined
to believe that the prisoner should receive a parole date at that
time, but that the decision will be reconsidered on a date certain.
This is well within the authority of the Board to do.
has no right to parole.
parole date.

Petitioner

Glasscock has no right to a particular

The Board of Pardons decision not to set a parole

date for Mr. Glasscock did not violate any right of the petitioner.
The Board of Pardons informed petitioner of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances that had been considered in reaching
its decision. R. 55. Petitioner has never claimed that he was not
given access to the materials considered by the Board in reaching
their decision.

Given these circumstances, the trial court

correctly dismissed this petition and that decision should be
affirmed on appeal.
B.
The fact that the Board of Pardons might not believe the
petitioner's claims of innocence did not work a substantial and
prejudicial denial of the constitutional rights of Mr. Glasscock.
Mr. Glasscock claims that he was, by his own fears and not the
actions

of

the Board

of

Pardons, precluded

from presenting

mitigating evidence before the Board of Pardons which would have
shown that Mr. Glasscock was not guilty of the crime he pled guilty
too and that the guilty plea was invalid.

Petitioner does not

claim that the Board would not permit him to present this evidence,
but rather that he feared that the Board would not believe his
claim that he was innocent of the crime to which he had pleaded
guilty.

Petitioner feared that, if the Board did not believe his
11

protestations of innocence, the Board would consider the petitioner
to be denying his responsibility for his criminal wrongdoing and
therefore be a poor risk for parole.
Mr. Glasscock's claim was properly rejected by the trial
court.

Petitioner did not raise this issue before the Board of

Pardons and could not raise it, or litigate it, for the first time
in the subsequent extraordinary writ proceeding.

Brinkerhoff v.

Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990).
The fact that the Board of Pardons may not believe an inmate's
protestations of innocence (especially where the inmate has pled
guilty to the charge and has not sought to have that guilty plea
set aside) does not create a substantial and prejudicial denial of
the inmate's constitutional rights. This is especially so when, as
here, the inmate did not actually present his evidence to the Board
but asks this Court to presume what the Board's reaction to that
evidence would have been.

This Court should not make such a

presumption that the Board, in a hypothetical situation that has
not

occurred,

would

violate

the

constitutional

rights

of

petitioner.
Indeed, the claims made by the petitioner are not actually
mitigating circumstances that would influence the Board's decision
concerning a parole date for Mr. Glasscock.

Rather than factors

that would influence the Board to believe that petitioner has
served sufficiently his sentence and is now ready to be placed on
parole, the petitioner's allegations instead address the issue of
whether or not petitioner is lawfully incarcerated in the first
12

place.

The claims of improprieties in the taking of his plea of

guilty would be more appropriately raised by the petitioner in a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and an extraordinary writ
proceeding pursuant to Rule 65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The only involvement of the Board of Pardons and Parole in
such claims would be in considering an application for a pardon,
not as mitigating factors in a parole hearing.
The trial court correctly held that a parole grant hearing is
not the proper forum for the petitioner to challenge his underlying
conviction.

The trial court correctly dismissed the instant

petition and that decision should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Glasscock's petition
for an extraordinary writ and its decision should therefore be
affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION NOT
REQUESTED BY THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
The State of Utah's Board of Pardons does not request oral
argument and a published opinion in this matter.

Petitioner's

claims are contrary to clearly established law and the issues
presented have been previously resolved by the Courts of Utah.
Respectfully submitted this

*Z&^

day of May, 1995.

s$msrz^4/

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee
13

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent-Appellee State of Utah, postage
prepaid, to the following on this the

of May, 1995:

David W. Glasscock
Inmate No. 18886
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

&
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ADDENDUM "A"

ra^KFTFST COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 0 2 1994
MARTHA S. STONEBROOK (5149)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Respondents
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

David Wayne Glasscock,
Plaintiff,

Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law,
and Final Order

v.
Board of Pardons,
Respondents.

Case No. 940902334 EC
Judge Pat B. Brian

The hearing on the Petition for Extraordinary Relief filed by
David Wayne Glasscock came before this Court and was heard on
November 18, 1994 at 10:30 a.m..

Petitioner appeared pro se.

Martha S. Stonebrook, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on
behalf of the Utah State Board of Pardons
Board").

(hereinafter "the

Based upon the pleadings filed in this matter, the

arguments of the parties, and for good cause shown thereon, this
Court issues the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Final Order:

00006S

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about July 29, 1991, petitioner entered a plea of

guilty to the offense of sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced
by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to serve not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
2.

Petitioner's

sentence and

conviction have not been

reversed or vacated of appeal.
3.

On June 24, 1992, the Board held petitioner's original

parole grant hearing at which time the Board set a rehearing date
of November, 1994.
4. On June 24, 1992, the Board entered its rationale for its
decision which weighed the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstances and determined that an alienist report
would be due prior to the rehearing date.
5.

On February 14, 1994, the Board responded to inquiries

made by petitioner as to the reasons for its decision of June 24,
1992.
6. The Board, in part, justified its decision on the victim's
age and the violent nature of the offense, petitioner's relationship to the victim, his denial of the offense, and the lack of sex
therapy while at the Utah State Prison. The Board also questioned
family

support

and

petitioner's

prior

arrest

conviction and

supervision history.

a
-000069

7.

A rehearing was held on November 4, 1994 to consider

whether petitioner should be granted a parole date.
conclusion

of

the hearing,

the Board

At the

took the matter under

advisement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This court does not have jurisdiction over nor does it

have the power to control the Board.
2.

The Board has complete discretion in determining when a

prisoner will be released.
3.

Petitioner does not have a protected interest in nor an

expectation of parole.
4.

The

Utah

sentencing

guidelines

and matrix are not

mandatory and are not binding on the Board.
5.

The parole hearing is not the proper forum in which to

reargue petitioner's case.
6.

In this matter, all elements of due process have been

met.

3

ORDER
Now, wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the relief
requested in respondent's Memorandum in Opposition is granted and
petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Relief

is denied and

dismissed with prejudice.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Pat B.
District Court Judg

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the <£$>

day of

November, 1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing unsigned
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER was mailed,
first-class postage to:
David Wayne Glasscock #18886
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah
84020
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ADDENDUM "B"

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code § 77-27-7 Parole or hearing dates - Interview Hearings - Report of alienists - Mental competency.
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine within six
months after the date of an offender's commitment to the custody of
the Department of Corrections, for serving a sentence upon
conviction of a felony or class A misdemeanor offense, a date upon
which the offender shall be afforded a hearing to establish a date
of release or a date for a rehearing, and shall promptly notify the
offender of the date.
R671-201-1.

Schedule and Notice.

Within six months of an offender's commitment to prison the
Board will give notice of the month and year in which the inmate's
original hearing will be conducted. A minimum of one week (7
calendar days) prior notice should be given regarding the specific
day and approximate time of such hearing.
An inmate who is serving up to a life sentence will be
eligible for a hearing after the service of three years.
An inmate who is serving a sentence of up to fifteen years
will be eligible for a hearing after the service of nine months.
An inmate who is serving a sentence of up to five years
including Class A Misdemeanor commitments will be eligible for a
hearing after the service of ninety days.
Excluded from the above provisions are inmates who are
sentenced to death.
An inmate may petition the Board to calendar him/her at a time
other than the usual times designated above or the Board may do so
on its own motion. A petition by the inmate shall set out the
exigencies which give rise to the request. The Board shall notify
the petitioner of its decision in writing as soon as possible.

